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Introduction
The paper investigates a two-country model of one-and two-way international migrations of individuals di¤erentiated by levels of talent and working in a single industry. During the last 20 years, migrations of skilled labor have increased signi…cantly (OECD, 2001 ) and they are now in ‡uencing the size and the structure of several industries. This phenomenon has become su¢ ciently widespread and multi-faceted that it is now often described as 'brain circulation' (Johnson and Regets, 1998) . In North America for instance, an average of about 29,000 individuals migrated yearly from the US to Canada between 1997 and 2002 while about 73,000 individuals moved in the other direction. 1 Although these ‡ows are small with respect to population, evidence suggests that these migrants are highly skilled in terms of education or income (Gera et al., 2004) . They are mostly concentrated in professions like managers, executives, engineers, scientists and entrepreneurs, and work predominently in knowledge-based industries like services and information technology. 2 Zucker and Darby (1995, 1999) have documented the ‡ows of star scientists across borders and how these highly talented individuals have shaped the biotechnology industry in its early stages. 3 E¤orts to attract foreign software specialists in Germany, return migrations to India and to China are other examples of the growing importance of talent for many industries. Clearly, economists should investigate brain circulation.
To address this issue, we consider a model with two key components. First, individuals working in a given industry are di¤erentiated according to talent (skill or ability), which for our purpose is treated as exogenous. Second, all individuals choose to be workers or entrepreneurs. This determines wage and the number of …rms (i.e., entrepreneurs). Because 1 See Gera et al. (2004) and Harris (2004) . A large proportion of these ‡ows are temporary migrating professionals bene…ting from NAFTA-TN visas. 2 OECD (2002) reports that 'a quarter of Silicon Valley …rms in 1998 were headed by immigrants from
China and India and collectively created 52'300 jobs and generated almost USD17 billion in sales'. 3 For example, during the 1990s, they identi…ed 417 star bioscientists worldwide; the US attracted 26 of them and lost 20 while Canada, Switzerland and the UK had a net total loss of 19, despite attracting 9 (Zucker and Darby, 1999 Restricting the analysis to two types of talent, the paper makes four points. First, migrations require the countries not only to be di¤erent but to be su¢ ciently so. Second, the equilibrium can exhibit two-way or one-way international migrations by talent types and because migrations involve both workers and entrepreneurs, migrations can also be expressed with respect to activities. Third, migrations impact the number, the size and the distribution of …rms. Finally, although countries with di¤erent talent endowments have generally con ‡icting incentives about migrations based on average welfare per capita, they always choose to allow migrations when such a decision is taken by majority voting. This is true whether migration policy is about immigrants, emigrants or both.
The literature on international mobility of skilled individuals has traditionally investigated the impact of the loss of human capital and of the loss of returns to public investments in training. We ignore these issue reviewed by Bhagwati and Wilson (1989) . Treating talent as exogenous, we also ignore how migrations can a¤ect human capital formation (Stark, 2003 Grossman (1984) investigates how opening a country to trade or to FDI a¤ects the choice of becoming entrepreneurs when entrepreneurship involves risk. These papers however do not consider international migrations.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next Section, the basic structure of the model 2 is laid out and the equilibrium without migrations is derived. The di¤erent pattern of migrations are analyzed in Section 3. In Section 4, we consider welfare and whether these countries allow migrations to occur. Section 5 concludes.
The Model and Equilibrium without Migration
The model is based on Lucas (1978) and Murphy et al. (1991 and a worker supplies one unit of labor. 4 The entrepreneur's earning is equal to …rm pro…t and thus to,
where p is the output price and f (l); the production function for l workers employed by the …rm. We assume f (:) is the same in both countries and exhibits decreasing marginal labor productivity. The labor and the output markets are competitive in both countries. With free trade, the output price is given and identical in both countries. Without loss of generality, we set p = 1 and assume that f (l) = l Maximizing (1) with respect to l, the number of workers hired by j -entrepreneur is
and the corresponding pro…t is
Hence, …rm size, measured by employment, and pro…t decrease with higher wages and increase with talent because revenue increases with talent but not cost. Increasing returns to talent induce individuals to become entrepreneurs on two counts: they earn higher pro…t for a given …rm size and they spread their talent over a larger …rm scale. 
there are relatively few 2 -individuals. We call it the 'few-talent case'.
In the second case where there is specialization by talent, all 1 -individuals are workers and all 2 -individuals are entrepreneurs. Hence, the labor supply is equal to '
; resulting in an equilibrium wage b
1=2
. Thus, all the …rms have the same size and pro…tability but wage and pro…t now directly depend on the 1 -and 2 -population. This is an equilibrium provided that no individual wants to switch activity and thus this case
There are now relatively more 2 -individuals than in the …rst case and we call it the 'intermediate case'.
In the third case, 2 -individuals can be entrepreneurs or workers and must be indi¤erent between the two activities (
). All workers (be they 1 or 2 ) have the same
and all the …rms are identical in size and pro…tability. The proportion of entrepreneurs in the 2 -population ( i 2 ) is determined by the labor market equilibrium and is equal to and less pro…table …rms disappear and all entrepreneurs are 2 -type. As the relative size of the 2 -population rises, the number of …rms increases, the demand for labor rises and so does the equilibrium wage. With costs rising, …rm pro…tability and size shrink. In the many-talent case, wage and pro…t are identical, and the demand for labor is su¢ ciently high for some 2 -individuals to be workers. As a result, wage is the highest and pro…t is the lowest of the three cases. in the total population h i . In the few-talent case, the number of …rms falls when ' Even though quite simple, the model generates three distinct cases where pro…t, wage, …rm size and the number of …rms are di¤erent. We now set the model in a two-country environment with international mobility to investigate the patterns of migrations and their e¤ects on activity choices.
Equilibria with Migrations
To concentrate on migration patterns, we assume that the two countries use the same technology ( A = B = 1). Then, in our model, a di¤erence in talent endowments is not su¢ cient to generate migrations. For example, the two countries could be di¤erent while both belonging to the few-talent case without migrations happening. This is so because earnings are the same for both types of individuals across the two countries. To generate migrations, the two countries should be su¢ ciently di¤erent (i.e., belong to di¤erent cases or be both in the intermediate case)
. From now on, we assume that country A is a many-talent case
and B is a few-talent case ( Fig.1a and 1b show that 1 -individuals, relatively abundant in B, may have an incentive to migrate to A because of earnings di¤erential. Conversely, 2 -individuals, relatively abundant in A, 5 In the few talent case, the number of …rms N i is
In the intermediate case, the number of …rms
In the many talent case,
6 may have an incentive to migrate to B. While this pattern of migrations is standard, the fact that two-way migrations can be evaluated not only for types of individuals but also for activities is interesting. This is so because, as shown in Section 2, in few-talent country B, 
Suppose both conditions hold, the equilibrium with two-way migrations determining x and y requires that
since individuals must be indi¤erent between net earnings in the destination country and earnings in the country of origin.
Another possible outcome is one-way migration. If it is from B to A (x > 0; y = 0),
and (7) still hold but (6) and (8) must be negative or equal to zero and conversely for one-way migration from A to B (x = 0; y > 0 when (6) and (8) hold and (5) and (7) 7 0). The conditions (5) and (6) indicate immediately that two-way migrations necessitate relatively low migration costs with respect to the talent (or productivity) di¤erential (i.e.,
) and thus that one-way migration requires one of the migration costs to be relatively high. If these conditions are necessary, they are not su¢ cient (we have ignored (7) and (8)). We now characterize the migration equilibria more precisely, especially the two-way migration equilibrium. 
. In this case, earnings in the migration equilibrium are . In this equilibrium, the migration cost for 1 -individuals is lower than for 2 -individuals and the two countries are never identical ( B < A ).
Proof.
Observe from (4) that 
in the intermediate case, ( 1 = 2 ) 2 < B < A < 1 which gives rise to two conditions:
With (9) and (10), the …rst inequality leads to n 2 > n 1 =(1 n 1 ) and the second to ( 1 = 2 ) 2 + n 1 ( 1 = 2 ) < n 1 =n 2 . Together they de…ne the su¢ cient range of c 2 over which two-way migrations hold when A and B fall in the intermediate case.
In addition to be low relative to the talent di¤erential, the two migration costs must be relatively similar but they cannot be identical. Since at least one migration cost is positive, the two countries cannot become identical with two-way migrations. To understand why (9) and (10) de…ne two equations with x and y as the two unknowns. De…ning
the migrations ‡ows of 1 -and 2 -individuals when the two economies are in the intermediate range are respectively
and y = A B ('
Since workers and entrepreneurs have the same incentive to migrate among 1 -individuals in B and among 2 -individuals in A, x and y include both workers and entrepreneurs. Hence, this equilibrium is consistent with two-way migrations of both entrepreneurs and workers.
Observe however that some migrants switch activity. Since all 1 -individuals are workers and all 2 -individuals are entrepreneurs in the equilibrium with migrations, some 1 -individuals who were entrepreneurs in country B before migrating are now workers in country A and some 2 -individuals who where workers before migrating are now entrepreneurs in country B. Overall, allowing migrations increases the number of entrepreneurs (or …rms) in the two countries provided that '
) > 0 and thus provided that the overall population of 1 -individuals is not too large as compared to 2 -individuals. 6 Speci…cally, j@G( 1 )=@(' 2 =' 1 )j < j@G( 2 )=@(' 2 =' 1 )j when ' 2 =' 1 < 1. 7 The change in the total number of …rms from allowing migrations is equal to the di¤erence between the number of entrepreneurs with migrations (' 
A 1 falls with migrations, the proportion of entrepreneurs among 2 -individuals rises even if A remains a many-talent country. Similarly, when country B remains a few-talent country with migrations, the proportion of entrepreneurs among 1 -individuals must fall with respect to the initial equilibrium since
Hence, given the initial no-migration equilibrium in A and B, migrations always involve both workers and entrepreneurs, and they make both countries more similar but never identical. In addition, an equilibrium with migrations requires that at least one country falls in the intermediate case and that both do so when migrations are two ways. In all these cases, industry structure in both countries is a¤ected not only by migrations but also by non-migrants' changes in activities. In the next Section, we consider the implications of these changes for the choice of migration policies.
Welfare, Voting and Migration Policies
To understand some of the policy implications of migrations, we …rst consider average welfare per capita. For country i, the welfare index is measured by total earnings, that is pro…t and wage. The proportion of 2 -individuals in the economy is z
population. Average welfare per capita is then,
for the few-talent, the intermediate and the many-talent case. It is easy to check that average welfare per capita increases with z i 2 up to the many-talent case where it is constant. This is because total welfare is a positive convex combination of earnings. In the few-talent case, most individuals have low earnings. In the many-talent case, all the …rms are run by the most able entrepreneurs and all the workers earn as much as the entrepreneurs and more than in the few-talent case. 9 Since half the population is entrepreneurs, this case is characterized by many small …rms. Clearly, if country i could select z i 2 , it would always choose to be a many-talent country and despite increasing returns to talent, 'small is beautiful'.
It is easy to extend the welfare analysis when migrations are allowed. With migrations, the proportion of 2 -individuals in the population changes in both countries such that z to allow migrations when this decision is based on majority voting. This conclusion also holds when one country remains in its inital range with migrations. 11 This means that both countries support migration policies be they about immigrants, emigrants or both. This strong result arises because activity choices are endogenous and individual's earnings are linked whether they are workers, entrepreneurs, 1 -type or 2 -type individuals.
Conclusions
The paper has developed a simple two-country-one sector model where individuals are differentiated according to two types of talent. The countries are di¤erent in talent endowment and all individuals choose to be workers or entrepreneurs. Allowing migrations generates incentives for the relatively abundant type of individuals to migrate to the other country.
There are both workers and entrepreneurs among migrants and, depending on the parameters of the model, there may be one-way or two-way migrations. Because the choice of activity is endogenous, some individuals switch activities when crossing the border and migrations induce some non-migrants to switch activities. As a result industry structure is sensitive to migrations of talented individuals. Finally, the endogenous choice of activities and the interdependance among individual's earnings imply that if a country allows migrations, it does not matter whether the migration policy is about immigrants, emigrants or both.
The model is admittedly simple but it captures some important sylized facts associated 11 Since the other country necessarily falls in the intermediate case, the individuals bene…ting from migrations win the decision. Both countries choose to allow migrations but in one, individuals are indi¤erent between migration and no migration.
13
with current patterns of migrations and in particular with brain circulation. It is also su¢ ciently simple to be used to address more complex issues associated with contemporary migration questions. For instance, the model could be expanded to investigate the links between trade and migration ‡ows by linking individuals' types to di¤erentiated products (Manasse and Turrini, 2001; Yeaple, 2003) . One could also increase the number of destination countries to understand better why some countries, like the US, seem more successful at attractings talented individuals than others. Finally, talent could be endogenized with the introduction of human capital formation. These are only some of the issues that need to be analyzed to understand the positive and normative aspects of brain circulation, a phenomenon the importance of which is likely to keep growing.
6 Appendix:
Proof of Proposition 2:
i) x > 0; y = 0: Since A and B fall in the intermediate case,
x) < 1. In equilibrium, x is determined by (7), which can be written as p 
